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COMMENTS
CLEARING THE AIR OF
ENVIRONMENTAL SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY: OHIO v.. UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
The hazardous release of pollutants has seriously jeopardized
the integrity of the environment.' In response to growing public
See H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2751, 2753.
By land, sea, and air, the enemies of man's survival relentlessly press their attack.
The most dangerous of all the enemies is man's own undirected technology. The
radioactive poisons from nuclear tests, the runoff into rivers of nitrogen fertilizers,
the smog from automobiles, [and] pesticides in food chains .... are examples of the
failure to foresee and control the untoward consequences of modern technology.
Id. (quoting N.Y. Times, May 3, 1969, at 34, col. 2 (city ed.)).
At the 1989 Economic Summit in Paris, eighteen environmental declarations were set
forth. See Council on Environmental Quality, 1990 Annual Report 417 (1990). The decla-
rations contained a condemnation of air and water pollution stating: "[sluch environmental
degregation endangers species and undermines the well being of individuals and society."
Id. at 417.
The concerns voiced at the Economic Summit were well founded considering that in
1987, 8.1 thousand metric tons of lead, 20.4 million metric tons of sulfur, 19.5 million
metric tons of nitrogen oxide, and 61.4 million metric tons carbon monoxide were released
into the atmosphere in the United States alone. Id. at 470-72. These emissions contributed
to the depletion of the ozone layer and to the increase in the global surface temperature by
33 degrees celsius in 1987, relative to a 1957-79 reference period mean. Id. at 465.
Additionally, throughout 1985, over 267 million tons of pollutants were discharged into
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concern, Congress has enacted legislation to curb environmental
degradation. 2 Two such enactments, the Water Pollution Preven-
the United States Coastal Waters. See Council on Environmental Quality, 1987-88 Annual
Report 327 (1988). These discharges contributed to the resulting impairment of 350 miles
of shoreline waters, 100 of which were categorized as severely impaired. Id. at 316. See also
Christenson, Regulatory Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Hazardous Waste in Indian Country, 72
IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1091 (1987) (hazardous waste threatens well-being of 700,000 persons
dwelling on Indian reservations); Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance with the RCRA
and Other Environmental Statutes: An Administrative Proposal, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513,
513 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance] (environmental pollution
poses substantial threat to health of American public).
Ironically, the federal government is one of the biggest polluters. See Cheng, Lawmaker as
Lawbreaker: Assessing Civil Penalties Against Federal Facilities Under RCRA, 57 U. CHi. L. REV.
845, 845 (1990) (federal government major violator of anti-pollution laws); Stever, Perspec-
tives on the Problem of Federal Facility Liability for Environmental Contamination, 17 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10114, 10114 (1987) (federal government responsible for substantial hazardous
waste); Note, When Will the Federal Government Waive the Sovereign Immunity Defense and Dis-
pose of Its Violations Properly?, 65 Cm.-KENT. L. REV. 581, 581 (1989) [hereinafter Note,
When Will Federal Government Waive] (yearly Defense Department produces over 500,000
tons of hazardous waste; Energy Department produces 2.5 million tons of hazardous waste
and 16 million tons of combined hazardous and radioactive waste); Note, Assuring Federal
Facility Compliance, supra, at 515 (Department of Defense accountable for "eighty percent
of the 1,000 to 1.400 federal facility hazardous waste . . . sites").
' See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988) (requires manu-
facturers using new chemicals to submit report to EPA describing effect of chemical on
health environment); Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988)
(purpose of Act is to protect, conserve, and encourage research on marine animals); Endan-
gered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988) (provides program for conservation of
endangered species of plants and animals); Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988) (objective of Act is to restore and maintain chemical, physical
and biological integrity of waters); Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1988)
(regulates dumping of material into waters); Pollution Casualties on the High Seas: United
States Intervention Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1487 (1988) (allows Commerce Department to
enforce regulations on shipping of oil to avoid water pollution); Ocean Pollution Research
and Development and Monitoring Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1709 (1988) (provides for re-
search development monitoring ocean pollution); Safety of Public Water Systems Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f-j (1988) (regulates maintenance of public water systems); National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988) (purpose is "[t]o declare a national
policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his envi-
ronment"); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1988) (coordinates research and
establishes standards for dissemination of information on noise emissions); Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988) (provides for conser-
vation of material and energy resources by regulating disposal of solid waste); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988) (promotes protection of air quality resources and initi-
ates pollution control programs); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) (provides for liability, compensa-
tion, clean up and emergency responses when hazardous substances are released); Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988) (provides for development of
mineral resources that do not harm environment). See generally Davis, Approaches to the Reg-
ulation of Hazardous Wastes, 18 ENVTL. L. 505 (1988) (national regulation of hazardous
waste).
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tion and Control Act ("Clean Water Act") 3 and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),4 impose regulation on
the disposal of pollutants into navigable waters5 and the disposi-
tion of solid waste products, respectively.6 These statutes also au-
3 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988) [hereinafter Clean Water Act].
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988) [hereinafter RCRA].
' See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). "The objective of [the Clean Water Act] is to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Id. See
also United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979) (Clean Water
Act designed to regulate sources emitting pollution into rivers, streams and lakes); Weyer-
haeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Act aimed at eliminating
discharge of pollutants into waters); Quarles Petroleum Co. v. United States, 551 F.2d
1201, 1206 (10th Cir. 1977) (overall intention of Congress in enacting Clean Water Act
was to eliminate or reduce water pollution throughout United States).
The Clean Water Act was originally enacted in 1948 and gave states the primary respon-
sibility of enforcing water pollution control laws. See District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631
F.2d 854, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v.
Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1271 (5th Cir. 1980) (Clean Water Act "relied primarily upon state-
promulgated water quality standards as the means for reaching its goal of enhancing the
quality of the nation's waters"). See generally J.B. BATTLE, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 7 (1986)(discussing state enforcement authority for control of water pollution under Clean Water
Act). Unfortunately, over the years the Clean Water Act proved to be ineffective. See H.R.
REP. No. 500, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 95, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3668, 3672 ("record show[ed] almost total lack of enforcement of [Act]"). The Act was
amended five times between 1948 and 1972 with little or no change in the nation's water
quality. See BATTLE, supra, at 7 (basic flaws in Act prevented effective enforcement). Finally
in 1972, the Clean Water Act was reconstructed to provide a "comprehensive" method of
abating chemical and biological water pollutants. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304, 318 (1981) (purpose of 1972 amendments was to establish comprehensive long-range
policy eliminating water pollution); Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37 (1975)(1972 amendments provide comprehensive program for controlling water pollution).
The 1972 Act contained a three-pronged system aimed at eliminating water pollution.
See BATTLE, supra, at 8:
First, the Environmental Protection Agency was directed to conduct a research pro-
gram and develop methods for waste treatment. Second, the Act authorized a mas-
sive construction program for municipal waste treatment works, with federal finance
assistance. Third, the Act established a comprehensive system of standards, permits,
and enforcement methods for control of the complete spectrum of polluting
materials.
Id.
' See 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1988). The objectives of RCRA "are to promote the protection
of health and the environment . . . by . . . assuring that hazardous waste management
practices are conducted in a manner which protects human health and the environment."
Id. See also United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 743 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1307 (1991) (RCRA requires management of hazardous waste "to prevent leakage, spill-
age, hazardous chemical reactions, and migration of toxins into the soil, water, or air");
Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989)(RCRA as relief for national difficulties caused by elimination of hazardous and solid
wastes).
RCRA was designed for three purposes. See Note, Landowner Liability Under CERCLA, 4
ST. JOHN'S J LEGAL COMMENT. 149, 151 n.l 1 (citing I D. STEVER, LAW OF CHEMICAL REGU-
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thorize states to enact their own anti-pollution schemes which,
upon approval from the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), may operate in lieu of federal regulation.' It is undis-
puted that federal facilities are required to comply, to a certain
extent, with state laws enacted pursuant to the aforementioned
Acts.8 However, whether the federal government has waived sov-
ereign immunity from civil penalties under the Clean Water Act
and RCRA remains unresolved.9 Recently, the United States
LATION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE 5.01, at 5-6 (1988)). These purposes are:
1) to provide a system for tracking and preserving a record of hazardous waste
movement from its inception to disposal ("cradle to grave"); 2) to ensure disposal is
accomplished so as to prevent escape of hazardous waste into the environment; and
3) to provide an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with the regulations.
Id. See also Cheng, supra note 1, at 846 ("RCRA ... established a 'cradle-to-grave' scheme
of measures . . . for regulating the generation, transport, treatment, and disposal of solid
waste."); Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance, supra note 1, at 532 (purpose of RCRA
was advancement of physical well-being of environment and preservation of resources). See
generally 2 S. COOKE, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY
AND LITIGATION § 9.01 (1990) (overview of RCRA).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), (c), & (k) (1988) (addressing implementation of state programs
and approval by EPA under Clean Water Act); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a) (1988) (listing
specifications for approval of state programs under RCRA).
The 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act instituted the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Eliminations System (NPDES). See EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources
Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976). Under NPDES, a state may issue permits allowing
for excretions into waters within state jurisdiction, after obtaining EPA endorsement of the
state program. Id. at 208. Without a permit, any emission of pollutants into the waters is
unlawful. Id. at 205. The governor of a state requesting a permit may submit to the EPA
its proposed program accompanied by a statement from the state's Attorney General that
the state is capable of carrying out the plan as proposed. Id. at 208. The EPA has the
power to evaluate the administration of the program and may revoke its sanction upon
determining that the program is not being operated according to the dictates of the Act.
Id.
I See Exec. Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,404 (1978) (constrained executive agen-
cies to cooperate with state environmental agencies).
I Compare Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1990)
(held Clean Water Act and RCRA waived sovereign immunity from state civil penalties)
and United States v. Washington, 872 F.2d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 1989) (held Congress had
not waived federal sovereign immunity under RCRA from civil penalties imposed by state
administrative agency) and Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago v. United States
Dep't of Navy, 722 F. Supp. 1565, 1572 (N.D. I1. 1989) (federal facilities subject to civil
penalties under Clean Water Act) and Maine v. United States Dep't of Navy, 702 F. Supp.
322, 330 (D. Me. 1988) (Clean Water Act and RCRA permit recovery of civil penalties by
state agency from federal government) with Mitzelfelt v. Dept. of Air Force, 903 F.2d
1293, 1296 (10th Cir. 1990) (held RCRA did not waive sovereign immunity from state civil
penalties) and McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinburger, 655 F. Supp. 601,
605 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (held sovereign immunity not waived under both Clean Water Act
and RCRA) and Meyer v. United States Coast Guard, 644 F. Supp. 221, 223 (E.D.N.C.
1986) (held under RCRA, sovereign immunity of federal government not waived for civil
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Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit scrutinized the sovereign
immunity doctrine and its relationship to both Acts in Ohio v.
United States Department of Energy ("D.O.E.").10
In D.O.E., a 1,050 acre uranium processing plant in Ohio,
owned by the United States Department of Energy and managed
under private contract," was allegedly responsible for the im-
proper disposal of hazardous wastes, the release of radioactive
materials into the environment, and the pollution of surface and
ground water.' 2 The State of Ohio instituted an action against the
Department of Energy and the private contractors who were in-
volved in the disposal, alleging the illegal release of hazardous
wastes and seeking relief, including civil penalties, under both the
Clean Water Act and RCRA. 13 The Department of Energy
claimed that the sovereign immunity of the federal government
barred the imposition of civil penalties." The Sixth Circuit, con-
sidering this issue on interlocutory appeal, affirmed the district
court's conclusion that sovereign immunity from civil penalties
had been waived by Congress under both the Clean Water Act
and RCRA. 5
In an opinion rendered by Judge Martin, the court initially ex-
amined section 1323 of the Clear Water Act, dealing with pollu-
tion control of federal facilities.' 6 The court asserted that the
1977 amendment to section 1323 was enacted in response to a
Supreme Court decision which construed section 1323 as waiving
sovereign immunity only for substantive mandates, but not for
procedural requisites, including any enforcement devices.' 7 The
court maintained that the plain language of the amendment ex-
plicitly subjecting federal facilities to "processes and sanctions"
was solid evidence of congressional intent to waive sovereign im-
penalties assessed by state agencies).
10 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991).
" D.O.E., 689 F. Supp. 760, 761 (S.D. Ohio 1988), affd, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990).
12. Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 761-62.
15 D.O.E., 904 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1990).
10 Id. at 1060-62.
1 Id. at 1060. See EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S.
200, 227-28 (1976).
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munity from civil penalties under the Act."8 The court pointed
out that section 1323's restriction on the waiver of sovereign im-
munity from civil penalties to those arising under federal law
would be meaningless if that section were construed as not waiv-
ing sovereign immunity for civil penalties at all. 9
Additionally, the court stated that the Clean Water Act require-
ment that a state claim arise under federal law for a waiver to
apply, had been satisfied under the circumstances.2 0 The court
then explained that since the Clean Water Act empowered states
to create their own anti-pollution laws which might, upon compli-
ance with EPA standards, be substituted for the provisions of the
Act, a state law thus generated should be considered to arise
under federal law.2 1
Next, the court considered whether RCRA provides sufficient
evidence of a congressional intent to waive, sovereign immunity
from civil penalties.2 While failing to find a sufficient waiver
under the "General Waiver" provision of the Act,23 the court
Is D.O.E., 904 F.2d at 1060. The court found the 1977 amendment to be evidence of an
intent to waive sovereign immunity for civil penalties. Id. The amendment changed the
statutory language from the earlier version which subjected federal agencies to mere 're-
quirements . . . to the same extent as any person is subject to such requirements.'" Id.
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1970)). The amendment provided language which subjected
federal agencies to " 'all' requirements, including 'process and sanctions.' " Id. at 1061.
The court found this to be clear evidence of an intent to subject federal facilities to civil
penalties under the FWPCA. Id.
19 Id. The court declared that the § 1323 limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity
for civil penalties to those "aris[ing] under federal law" would become "superfluous" if
§ 1323 were interpreted as not waiving sovereign immunity for civil penalties at all. Id.
2o Id.
21 Id. The court further noted that the Clean Water Act authorized the EPA to enforce
state permits as federal regulations. Id. The court viewed the EPA's suspension of its prac-
tice of dispensing permits in favor of the states themselves granting permits under state
water pollution laws as additional evidence of a state-federal affiliation. Consequently, the
court found a distinct waiver of sovereign immunity for civil penalties by federal entities
guilty of offenses under the Clean Water Act. Id.
22 Id. at 1062-65.
23 D.O.E., 904 F.2d at 1062. The court, citing the "General Waiver" provision of
RCRA, pointed to two relevant sections. Id. The first states, in relevant part, that the fed-
eral government will be subjected to "all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
both substantive and procedural (including any requirement for permits or reporting or
any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to
enforce such relief)." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988)). Secondly, the court pointed to
another part of the provision which states: "[n]either the United States, nor any agent,
employee, or officer thereof, shall be immune or exempt from any process or sanction of
any State or Federal Court, with respect to the enforcement of any such injunctive relief."
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held that there was an express waiver from civil penalties under
the "Citizen Suit" provision codified in 42 U.S.C. § 6972.24 The
court noted that this provision explicitly provides that "any per-
son" is empowered to institute a civil suit against "any person,"
including the United States.25 Under section 6972, "persons" per-
mitted to bring actions include states, as specified in section 6903
(15).26 Accordingly, the court asserted that Ohio was eligible to
initiate this action. The court then reasoned that since section
6972 authorizes district courts to impose civil penalties pursuant
to section 6928(a) and (g),11 the United States was subject to such
penalties.2" Finally, relying on policy considerations, the court
concluded that Congress intended civil penalties on federal facili-
ties under section 6972 of RCRA.30
In his dissent, Judge Guy asserted that the waivers under both
the Clean Water Act and RCRA were too narrow to support the
imposition of civil penalties on the United States. 1 He argued
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988)). The court, disturbed by this general provision, held
that despite outside indicators that Congress did want to waive sovereign immunity for civil
penalties here, any such waiver was not clear enough to be recognized. Id. The court was
also concerned with discrepancies between the waiver provisions of the Clean Water Act
and RCRA. Id. After comparing the waiver provisions of both Acts, the court stated that
while under the Clean Water Act federal entities were subject to "all . . . requirements
includ[ing] sanctions," the RCRA provision merely caused the federal government to sub-
mit to "all requirements." D.O.E., 904 F.2d at 1062 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988)). Judge
Martin reasoned that if "all requirements" encompassed sanctions, the mention of sanc-
tions in the Clean Water Act would be meaningless. Id. Additionally, Judge Martin noted
that the "General Waiver" provision of the RCRA expressly addressed injunctive remedies
twice, but failed to mention civil penalties. Id. The court concluded that this evidence ap-
peared "to omit civil penalties too neatly to be an accident" and that any evidence of in-
tended monetary relief is far too ambiguous to be recognized. Id.
I d. at 1064. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988) ("Citizen Suit" provision of RCRA).
"6 See D.O.E., 904 F.2d at 1064-65 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988)).
2" See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1988). This provision furnishes definitions for the purposes
of RCRA and includes states in the definition of "persons." Id.
27 D.O.E., 904 F.2d at 1064.
28 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (a), (g) (1988) (civil penalties provision of RCRA).
29 D.O.E., 904 F.2d at 1064.
SO Id. at 1065. The court reasoned that in light of the goal of eliminating unsafe disposal
of hazardous wastes, the only valid interpretation of Congress' intent was to apply civil
penalties to federal facilities as well as private parties, which would be consistent with the
other aspects of the "Citizen Suit" provision. Id.
21 See id. at 1065-68 (Guy, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the autonomous na-
ture of state anti-pollution laws precluded their characterization as arising under federal
law. Id. at 1068. Since § 1323(a) of the Clean Water Act restricts the liability of the United
States "to those civil penalties arising under Federal law," civil penalties are not, the dis-
sent argued, waived under the state crafted statute. Id. at 1067. In considering RCRA, the
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that the addition of the express language in section 1323(a) of the
Clean Water Act restricting federal liability recognized an explicit
waiver of sovereign immunity while limiting its breadth.3 2 Addi-
tionally, he reasoned that when Congress implemented a state per-
mit system to operate in lieu of federal regulation, it intended to
make the states the principal regulators under the Clean Water
Act."3 Consequently, civil penalties administered by state agencies
did not arise under federal law.34
In contemplating the application of RCRA, the dissent agreed
that section 6928(a) and (g) allow for civil penalties to be imposed
against "any person" violating RCRA." However, it explained
that since the appropriate section to be applied to the enforce-
ment provision, section 6903 (15), did not expressly include the
United States in its definition of "person," Congress did not in-
tend the Unites States to be subject to civil penalties.3 6
It is submitted that the court was correct in determining that
the tenets of sovereign immunity require a waiver to be unequivo-
cal. However, it is proposed that the decision in D.O.E., in finding
a waiver of sovereign immunity for civil penalties under the Clean
Water Act, was not justified by either the language of the statute
dissent deduced that the United States would be subject to citizen suits soliciting declara-
tory or injunctive relief, but not civil penalties. Id. at 1069.
32 Id. at 1067 (Guy, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1067 (Guy, J., dissenting).
" D.O.E., 904 F.2d at 1068 (Guy, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1069 (Guy, J., dissenting). Whether those penalties may be assessed against the
Department of Energy, the dissent argued, depends wholly on whether the Department of
Energy can be characterized as a "person." Id.
" Id. (Guy, J., dissenting). Judge Guy explained that the congressional definition of
"person" for the functions of the Act as specified by 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) includes individ-
uals, trusts, firms, joint stock companies, corporations (including government corpora-
tions), partnerships, associations, municipalities, commissions, states and their political sub-
divisions, and any interstate body. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1988)). He argued
that if Congress had intended the United States to be subject to civil penalties, it would
have expressly included the United States within its definition of "person." Id. He rea-
soned that the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the conspicuous omis-
sion of the United States from the general definition of "person" is that Congress did not
intend, nor specifically legislate, a waiver of sovereign immunity for civil penalties under
the "Citizen Suit" provision. Id. The fairest reading of § 6972 in conjunction with §
6928(a), (g), and § 6903(15), the dissent argued, is that the United States is subject to
citizen suits by states seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, but not for civil penalties.
Id. (Guy, J., dissenting). Therefore, Judge Guy concluded that the majority opinion mis-
read RCRA and wrongfully broadened the scope of the potential exposure to liability of
the Department of Energy. Id.
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or its legislative history. Further, it is suggested that the court's
analysis regarding the existence of a waiver of sovereign immunity
to civil penalties under RCRA was erroneous and resulted in an
unacceptable broadening of the statute's scope. It is submitted
that the court's result-oriented approach resulted in a usurpation
of legislative duties by the judiciary.
This Comment will analyze the requirements necessary for find-
ing a waiver of sovereign immunity. Additionally, it will examine
the legislative histories and plain language of the Clean Water Act
and RCRA. Finally, this Comment will discuss relevant policy
ramifications of waiving sovereign immunity and propose consid-
erations for future legislation.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In their relations with the federal government, states are re-
stricted by the doctrines of federal supremacy and sovereign im-
munity." The federal supremacy precept is grounded in the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,3" which man-
dates that federal law cannot be superseded by the law of any
state."9 With respect to the Clean Water Act and RCRA, Congress
has expressed its intention of allowing the states to implement leg-
" See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (conflicting state law yields to federal
law); Note, Assuring Federal Compliance, supra note 1, at 520. "Sovereign immunity and the
supremacy clause are two major legal limitations that threaten the viability of the partner-
ship between state and federal governments." Id. See generally Breen, Federal Supremacy and
Sovereign Immunity Waiver in Federal Environmental Law, 15 ENVT'L L. REP. 10,326, 10,327-
28 (1985) (effect of federal supremacy and sovereign immunity on environmental statutes).
3 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
31 See English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 (1990) (state law pre-empted
under supremacy clause); Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan-
sas, 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989) ("Congress has the power under the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI of the Constitution to pre-empt state law."); see also Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S.
Ct. 865, 872 (1991). "[Tlhe Supremacy Clause . .. is 'not a source of any federal rights';
rather it 'secure[s] federal rights by according them priority when t hey come into conflict
with state law.'" Id. (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600,
613 (1979)).
"State law may run afoul of the Supremacy Clause in two distinct ways: the law may
regulate the Government directly or discriminate against it . . . or it may conflict with an
affirmative command of Congress." North Dakota v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1986, 1994
(1990) (citation omitted).
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islation, within federal guidelines, to regulate the disposal of haz-
ardous substances. 40
The doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes any party from
bringing suit against a sovereign absent the acquiescence of that
sovereign."1 Waivers of the federal government's sovereign immu-
nity may only be effected by congressional mandate, 42 and any leg-
islation intending to subject the United States to liability must
clearly and unequivocally express this purpose.' Absent the exis-
tence of an express waiver, a state may not subject the federal
"40 See infra notes 51-86 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history and plain.
meaning of Clean Water Act and RCRA).
41 See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 315 (1986). "As sovereign, the United
States, in the absence of its consent, is immune from suit." Id.; United States v. Mitchell,
463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). "It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without
its consent ...."Id.; Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands, 461 U.S.
273, 287 (1983). "The basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States
can not be sued at all without the consent of Congress." Id.; United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). "The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it
consents to be sued ...." Id. (citations omitted); Garrett v. United States, 640 F.2d 24, 26
(6th Cir. 1981). The United States is exempt from suit absent its consent. Id. See also
Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982) "[T]he
traditional principal of sovereign immunity ... recognizes that the Government may attach
conditions to its consent to be sued." Id.
"" See United States v. Dalm, 110 S. Ct. 1361, 1368 (1990) (power to consent to suits
against federal government reserved to Congress); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,
30 (1953) (no action may be brought against United States unless authorized by legisla-
ture); Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Co., 317 U.S. 575, 580 (1943) (Congress delineates
sovereign immunity); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506,
512 (1940) (waiver of federal sovereign immunity must be by congressional consent).
,' See United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) ("[A] waiver of [sovereign immunity]
can not be implied but must be unequivocally expressed."); United States v. Shaw, 309
U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940) (specific statutory consent necessary to waive federal sovereign
immunity); Mitzelfelt v. Dept. of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 1990)
(waiver of sovereign immunity must be express).
"There can not be a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is clear, concise,
and unequivocal." McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 655 F. Supp.
601, 602 (E.D. Cal. 1986). When any doubt exists, the conclusion must be that there is no
waiver. Id. Ambiguous language fails to amount to a waiver. Id. "Any limitation on the
United States' consent to be sued must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign and
may not be modified by implication." Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680,
683-85 (1983)).
In United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941), the Court declared that since
the statute being interpreted was one which would relinquish sovereign immunity it would
have to be interpreted strictly. Id. The Court further stated that statutory language must
be conservatively construed when dealing with a waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. See gen-
erally Kongable, Civil Penalties Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: Must Federal
Facilities Pay?, 30 A.F. L. REv. 21, 22-25 (1989) (cases which held government waivers of
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed).
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government to civil penalties."
It is submitted that the court in D.O.E. was correct in determin-
ing that the tenets of sovereign immunity require a waiver to be
unequivocal. However, while initially advocating a strict construc-
tion of potential waivers of sovereign immunity,4 5 the court did
not ultimately adhere to the standards it advanced. 4" The argu-
ments presented by the court fail to demonstrate how a waiver of
sovereign immunity can rightfully be implied from the language
of the statutes.47 Although the federal government's sovereign im-
munity with respect to environmental protection acts has gradu-
ally diminished,48 Congress has not expressly indicated its desire
to subject the federal government to civil penalties under either
" See Block, 461 U.S. at 280. The Block Court stated that "[t]he States of the Union, like
all other entities, are barred by federal sovereign immunity from suing the United States in
the absence of an express waiver of this immunity by Congress." Id. (quoting California v.
Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 61 (1979)) ("It is settled that the United States must give its consent
to be sued even when one of the States invokes [the Supreme] Court's original jurisdiction
. ... ); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 387 (1939) "The exemption of the
United States from being sued without its consent extends to a suit by a state." Id.; Kansas
v. United States, 204 U.S. 331, 342 (1907). Public policy forbids the United States from
being sued by a state absent consent. Id.; see also Mitzelfelt v. Dept. of Air Force, 903 F.2d
1293, 1295 (10th Cir. 1990). "[Elven when Congress clearly provides that federal facilities
are to comply with state requirements, states may not impose sanctions for noncompli-
ance-either civil or administrative-absent express Congressional authorization." Id.
(quoting Donnelly & Van Ness, The Warrior and the Druid - The DOD and Environmental
Law, 33 FED. BAR NEWS 37, 38 (1986)).
"' See D.O.E., 904 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1990); cert granted, I IIS. Ct. 2256 (1991).
"A waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear, express and unambiguous; it cannot be
implied from vague language." Id. (citing Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. Of Univ.
School & Lands, 46 U.S. 273, 280 (1983); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 187 (1976)).
4 See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text (rationale of D.O.E. court).
' See infra notes 60-66, 76-86 and accompanying text (analysis of D.O.E. court's
rationale).
48 See McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601, 605
(E.D. Cal. 1986) (Congress slowly waiving sovereign immunity in environmental legisla-
tion). Compare Air Pollution Control Research and Technical Assistance, Pub. L. No. 84-
159, § 1-7, 69 Stat. 322, 322-23 (1955) (predecessor to 1955 Clean Air Act contained no
waiver of federal sovereign immunity) with Air Pollution Control, Pub. L. No. 86-365, § 2,
73 Stat. 646, 646 (1959) (federal facilities required to comply with air pollution control
agencies "to extent practical") and Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 7, 77 Stat. 392,
399 (1963) ( federal facilities required to obtain permit to discharge matter, from Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare) and Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
604, § 5, 84 Stat. 1676, 1689 (1970) (federal facilities required to comply with federal and
state restrictions unless exempted by president) and Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 116, 91 Stat. 685, 711 (1977) (federal facilities subjected to state
procedural requirements).
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the Clean Water Act or RCRA. 9 Moreover, since Congress is
aware that the language of a waiver must be unequivocal, courts
are correct in only recognizing congressional waivers that are
clearly and explicitly set forth in the history of the legislation."
II. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
A. Legislative History
The Clean Water Act was enacted to provide standards for the
purpose of reparation and preservation of the country's waters.51
Originally passed by Congress in June of 1948, the Clean Water
Act has been amended on numerous occasions in attempt to facili-
tate its goals.5" In 1972, an amendment to the Act established the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") as a
method of gauging and implementing effluent limitations.5
" See Mitzelfelt v. Dept. of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1295 (10th Cir. 1990) (legislative
history surrounding enactment of RCRA is general and does not indicate intent to waiver
sovereign immunity from civil penalties); McClellan, 655 F. Supp. at 605 (Congress waived
sovereign immunity for injunctive relief but "[i]t has not jumped the magical line, how-
ever, and waived sovereign immunity [under Clean Water Act or RCRA] for purposes
other than injunctive relief"); Meyer v. United States Coast Guard, 644 F. Supp. 221, 223
(E.D.N.C. 1986) (legislative history indicates no intent by Congress to waive sovereign im-
munity from civil penalties under RCRA).
11 See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1981) (courts must assume Con-
gress is aware of how to legislate waiver); Mitzelfelt, 903 F.2d at 1295-96 ("Congress knew
how to indicate an intent to waive sovereign immunity to state civil penalties and did not
do so .... ); McClellan, 655 F. Supp. at 604 (courts "must assume that the learned mem-
bers of Congress, some of whom are learned members of various bars, can say waiver of
sovereign immunity for civil penalties just as easily as any eighth grader writing the same
type of legislation."); see also Kongable, supra note 43, at 25 (since Congress is aware waiv-
ers must be unequivocally expressed, courts presume that valid waivers will be legislated
with sufficient clarity).
6 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). "The objective of this Chapter is to restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Id. See supra
note 5 and accompanying text (expounding on objectives of Clean Water Act).
11 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988). The explanatory notes reveal that the Clean
Water Act was originally enacted in 1948 and subsequently amended in 1952, 1956, 1959-
1961, 1965, 1966, 1970-1972, 1977, and 1987. Id.
'3 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1988). " '[E]ffluent limitation' means any restriction estab-
lished by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical,
physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged from point sources into
navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of
compliance." Id; see also McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F.
Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Cal. 1988). The court stated:
Section 30 1(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a), prohibits the discharge
of pollutants into navigable waters of the United States except pursuant to a permit
issued under section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The EPA Administrator is
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Under NPDES, it is illegal for persons to discharge pollutants un-
less they acquire a permit and conform with NPDES specifica-
tions." The EPA is charged with both the creation of minimal
NPDES standards and the issuance of permits pursuant to fulfill-
ment of those standards. 5 However, under NPDES, states are also
authorized to promulgate their own standards and issue permits
upon EPA approval." In June of 1976, the United States Su-
preme Court in Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel.
State Water Resources Control Board"' held that federal facilities
were not subject to state permit requirements under the 1972
directed to establish effluent limitations and standards of performance for "point
sources" of pollution. [Clean Water Act] §§ 304, 306, 307, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314,
1316, 1317.
Id; see also supra note 5 (discussing 1972 amendments to Clean Water Act). See generally
Van Putten & Jackson, Environmental Law: More Than Just a Passing Fad: The Dilution Of The
Clean Water Act, 19 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 863, 874-82 (1986) (overview of NPDES).
See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 311 (1981) (EPA promulgated regula-
tions establishing specific effluent limitations incorporated as conditions of permit); see also
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129 (1977). "In sum, the language
of the statute supports the view that § 301 limitations are to be adopted by the Administra-
tor, that they are to be based primarily on classes and categories, and that they are to take
the form of regulations." Id.; McClellan, 707 F. Supp. at 1192. The Court stated that
"through [NPDES], established pursuant to section 402 of the Clean Water Act, these stan-
dards and limitations, together with any applicable limitations based on state law, are incor-
porated into individual NPDES permits which regulate a particular person's discharges into
waters of the United States." Id.
11 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1371 (1977)
(Clean Water Act authorizes EPA to set standards and issue permits under NPDES); see also
Van Putten & Jackson, supra note 53, at 874. "The Act authorizes EPA to issue NPDES
permits that exempt dischargers from the blanket prohibition ... provided the discharge
meets several other requirements of the Act. In particular, NPDES permits must contain
effluent limitations on the amounts of specific pollutants - especially priority toxic pollu-
tants - discharged." Id. (citations omitted).
See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 52 (1987)
(states empowered to issue permits authorizing discharge of pollutants provided program
conforms to federal guidelines and is approved by EPA); EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200,
203 n.4 (1976) (states authorized to promulgate water quality standards, as well as imple-
mentation plan, meeting certain criteria) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(1),(3)); McClellan, 707
F. Supp. at 1192 ("Under section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act, a state may administer
the NPDES permit program upon EPA approval."); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1988).
The section states:
[Tihe Administrator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit for
the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants... upon condition that
such discharge will meet either . . . all applicable requirements . . . or prior to the
taking of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements, such con-
ditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of
this chapter.
Id.
"' 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
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amendments to the Clean Water Act.58 As a result of this decision,
Congress amended the Clean Water Act in 1977 to subject federal
facilities to all of the requirements under the Act and to waive
sovereign immunity "for those civil penalties arising under Fed-
eral law." 9
It is proposed that the decision in D.O.E., which found a waiver
of sovereign immunity from civil penalties under the Clean Water
Act, was not justified by the legislative history of the Act. Al-
though the circumstances surrounding the 1977 amendments in-
dicate that Congress intended to subject federal facilities to sub-
stantive and procedural requirements of state anti-pollution
laws,6" the D.O.E. court overreached by expanding the definition
of "requirements" and "sanctions" to include civil penalties.61
" Id. at 227. The Court stated that if Congress intended to subject federal facilities to
stare NPDES permit programs "it may legislate to make that intention manifest." Id. at
228.
" See 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988). Section 1323(a) states:
(a) Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and ju-
dicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property
or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the dis-
charge or runoff of pollutants, and each officer, agent, or employee thereof in the
performance of his official duties, shall be subject.to, and comply with, all Federal,
State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and process and
sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water pollution in the same man-
ner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity including the payment of
reasonable service charges. The preceding sentence shall apply (A) to any require-
ment whether substantive or procedural (including any recordkeeping or reporting
requirement, any requirement respecting permits and any other requirement, what-
soever), (B) to the exercise of any Federal, State, or local administrative authority,
and (C) to any process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local
courts or in any other manner. This subsection shall apply notwithstanding any im-
munity of such agencies, officers, agents, or employees under any law or rule of law.
... No officer, agent, or employee of the United States shall be personally liable for
any civil penalty arising from the performance of his official duties, for which he is
not otherwise liable, and the United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties
arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to enforce an order or the
process of such court.
Id. (emphasis added); see also S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67, reprinted in 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4326, 4392. The report states that:
The act has been amended to indicate unequivocally that all Federal facilities and
activities are subject to all of the provisions of State and local pollution laws. Though this
was the intent of the Congress in passing the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments, the Supreme Court, encouraged by Federal agencies, has miscon-
strued the original intent.
Id. (emphasis added).
"O See supra note 56 and accompanying text (addressing intent of Congress).
" See McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1198
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Similarly, it is proposed that by categorizing state laws - imple-
mented in accordance with EPA guidelines and intended to func-
tion in lieu of federal regulation - as arising under federal law,
the court ignored the fact that NPDES is initiated and adminis-
tered under state law.
B. Plain Language
It is submitted that an examination of the plain language6 2 of
the Clean Water Act indicates that the reasoning of the D.O.E.
court is flawed. The contention advanced by the court - that any
reader would construe the phrase in section 1323, which subjects
the federal government to "all . .. requirements .. .and sanc-
tions" imposed under the Act, to include civil penalties - is not
supported by a reading of the section in its entirety."3 Had civil
penalties been included within the meaning of "requirements" or
"sanctions," the subsequent sentence specifically addressing civil
penalties would be superfluous.64
The express language of the disputed sentence in section 1323
subjects the United States only to those civil penalties arising
under federal law."' The D.O.E. court acknowledged that for the
(1988). Defining "requirements to mean merely objective and administratively preestab-
lished water pollution control standards." Id.; McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v.
Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601, 605 (1986). "There will not be a waiver brought about by
implication or by bootstraping or by borrowing .... Congress could easily have stated that
federal facilities would be liable not only to injunctive relief but also to civil or criminal
penalties." Id.
" See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940). "When
aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there cer-
tainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on
.superficial examination.'" Id.; United States v. Washington, 872 F.2d 874, 879 (9th Cir.
1989). "In devining Congressional intent, 'we look first to the statutory language and then
to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.' " Id. at 879. (quoting Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984)). See generally 2A SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (1984) (guidelines of statutory interpretation).
", See McClellan, 655 F. Supp. at 604 (plain language of statute does not support waiver
of sovereign immunity from civil penalties under RCRA).
" See 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988); see also Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison-Knudson
Co., 577 F.2d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1978). "Statutes should not be construed so as to make
mere surplusage of any provision included therein." Id. (citations omitted); Klein v. Repub-
lic Steel Corp., 435 F.2d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1970) (all words and provisions of statutes are
intended to have meaning and should be given effect and not construed as surplusage)
(citations omitted). See generally SINGER, supra note 62 (same).
6 See supra note 59 (limiting civil penalties to those which arise under federal law).
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federal government to waive sovereign immunity, claims against
federal agencies must arise under federal law.66 It is submitted
that a review of the language of the statute as a whole refutes the
court's assertion that Ohio's anti-pollution law is one "arising
under Federal law." The statute, as drafted, consistently makes
specific, independent reference to federal law and state permit
programs promulgated pursuant to the Clean Water Act. 67 It
seems unlikely that, for this one sentence, Congress would change
its method of phraseology to save space, when to do so would
clearly cause confusion. 8  Section 1342(b), which regulates
NPDES permits, conspicuously provides that "each State desiring
to administer its own permit program . . .may submit ...a ...
description of the program it proposes to establish and administer
under state law." 6 9
III. THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT
A. Legislative History
RCRA was passed by Congress in 1976 to regulate hazardous
waste from inception to elimination." Section 6926 of the Act
00 See Ohio v. Department of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir. 1990), cert granted,
111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991).
67 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1318(c). The statute provides:
(c) Application of State Law. Each state may develop and submit to the Administra-
tor procedures under State law for inspection, monitoring, and entry with respect to
point sources located in such State. If the Administrator finds that the procedures
and the law of any State relating to inspection, monitoring, and entry are applicable
to at least the same extent as those required by this section, such State is authorized
to apply and enforce its procedures for inspection, monitoring, and entry with re-
spect to point sources located in such State (except with respect to point sources
owned or operated by the United States).
Id. (emphasis added)
" See supra note 50 and accompanying text (addressing argument that courts must as-
sume Congress knows how to effectively create waiver).
09 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (emphasis added).
70 See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONG.&
ADMIN. NEws 6238, 6241-42 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1491]. The House Report stated:
The Committee believes that the approach taken by this legislation eliminates the
last remaining loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated land disposal of
discarded materials and hazardous wastes. Further, the Committee believes that this
legislation is necessary if other environmental laws are to be both cost and environ-
mentally effective. At present the federal government is spending billions of dollars
to remove pollutatns [sic] from the air and water, only to dispose of such pollutants
on the land in an environmentally unsound manner. The existing methods of land
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empowers the states to implement and administer hazardous waste
disposal programs, replacing federal regulations, subject to EPA
approval. 1 Prior to the passage of the Act, the House and the
Senate contemplated distinct renditions of the bill, 2 although
neither body proffered a conference report.7 The version first
considered by the House contained an explicit waiver of sovereign
immunity.74 The House debated this version, and agreed to ac-
cept, with scant deliberation, the Senate's phrasing for the federal
facilities provision which did not mention waiving sovereign im-
munity for civil penalties.7 5
It is suggested that the court's assertion in D.O.E. that the legis-
lative history of the Act supports the imposition of civil penalties,
is without merit, and results in an unacceptable broadening of the
statute's scope.7' The D.O.E. court rationalized that since Con-
gress was concerned with the pollution emitted by various federal
facilities, it must have intended that the federal government be
subject to civil penalties under RCRA.77 Congress has evidenced
disposal often result in air pollution, subsurface leachate and surface run-off, which
effect air and water quality. This legislation will eliminate this problem and permit
the environmental laws to function in a coordinated and effective way.
Id. -
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988). Section 6926(b) provides:
Any state which seeks to administer and enforce a hazardous waste program pursu-
ant to this subchapter may develop and, after notice and opportunity for public
hearing, submit to the Administrator an application, in such form as he shall re-
quire, for authorization of such program .... Such State is authorized to carry out
such program in lieu of the Federal program under this subchapter ... in such State
and to issue and enforce permits for the storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous
waste
Id.
" See Mitzelfelt v. Dept. of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1295 (10th Cir. 1990) (House and
Senate considered different versions of RCRA); Meyer v. United States Coast Guard, 644
F. Supp. 221, 223 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (same); Cheng, supra note 1, at 855 (same).
73 See Cheng, supra note 1, at 856 (Senate and House failed to issue conference report).
"' See Mitzelfelt, 903 F.2d at 1295 (House version "specifically subjected federal agencies
to civil penalties"); Meyer, 644 F. Supp. at 223 (House bill authorized civil penalties).
" See Meyer, 644 F. Supp. at 223. In fact, the legislators did not specifically address the
issue of civil penalties; Mitzelfelt, 903 F.2d at 1295 (legislative history makes no reference to
intention by Congress to waive federal sovereign immunity to civil penalties); Cheng, supra
note 1, at 856 (committee hearings and floor debates did not explicitly consider whether
Congress intended to subject federal facilities to civil penalties).
" See Meyer, 644 F. Supp. at 223. "The legislative history of RCRA indicates that Con-
gress did not intend for federal facilities to be subject to civil penalties." Id.
" See Ohio v. Department of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1990); cert granted,
11I S. Ct. 2256 (1991).
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its concern by subjecting federal agencies to various anti-pollution
laws and by allowing courts to use other enforcement mechanisms
to compel compliance. 8 As such, it is submitted that a desire to
prevent federal entities from polluting, without more, does not
justify judicial imposition of civil penalties on the federal govern-
ment, absent the communication of an unequivocal intent to do so
by Congress.
B. Plain Language
It is conceded that the D.O.E. court correctly decided that the
General Waiver Provision of RCRA may not be construed to pro-
vide a waiver, given that the Act failed to expressly waive the sov-
ereign immunity of the federal government from civil penalties."9
However, it is suggested that the court erred when it held that the
Civil Suit Provision supports a waiver.8 " The court attempted to
justify its position by claiming that relevant provisions of section
6928(g), the "[federal enforcement" section, derive the meaning
of "person" from the Citizen Suit Provision instead of the general
definition section which defines "person" for the purposes of
RCRA.8 1
Section 6928(g) mandates that civil penalties be paid to the
United States. 2 The practical result of the D.O.E. court's inter-
pretation, is simply to have the Department of Energy pay the
penalties into the federal treasury." Additionally, the relevant
federal enforcement provisions were not drafted to be exclusively
activated by citizen suits. 84 There is no indication that Congress
intended section 6928 to be read differently, so as to depend on
78 See supra note 2 (listing examples of acts restricting ability to pollute/damage
environment).
"' See D.O.E. 904 F.2d at 1063 (Court found no clear-cut waiver of sovereign immunity).
go See Meyer, 644 F. Supp. at 223. "[There is no language in this statute [RCRA] that
suggests that the federal government was intending to waive its immunity against the impo-
sition of civil penalties. On the contrary, it seems to contemplate only obligations arising
from injunctions." Id.
8' See D.O.E., 904 F.2d at 1065.
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g) (1988).
88 See D.O.E., 904 F.2d at 1069 n.4 (Guy, J., dissenting).
See 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (a) (Administrator may take action on basis of any information
indicating violation).
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which provision authorized use of its sanctions.8" It is submitted
that the court failed to explain why Congress would ignore the
General Waiver Provision, which specifically addressed the issue
of sovereign immunity, only to subsequently choose a convoluted
path as its means for waiving the federal government's sovereign
immunity. Such interpretation is at odds with the court's finding
that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be clearly expressed.86
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS
Federal-state corroboration is a practical method of implement-
ing effective anti-pollution legislation.8 The federal government,
by virtue of its comprehensive jurisdiction, is in the best position
to coordinate environmental protection efforts.88 In addition, re-
quiring each state to observe minimum standards improves the
quality of the environment as a whole. 89 Additionally, consistency
88 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), (g) (1988). The statute provides in relevant part:
(a) Compliance orders.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), whenever on the basis of any information
the Administrator determines that any person has violated or is in violation of any
requirement of this subchapter (42 USC § 6921 et seq.), the Administrator may is-
sue an order ... requiring compliance immediately or within a specified time period,
or both, or the Administrator may commence a civil action in the United States
district court in the district in which the violation occurred for appropriate relief,
including a temporary or permanent injunction.
(g) Civil penalty. Any person who violates any requirement of this subchapter [42
USC § 6921 et seq.] shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty in an
amount not to exceed $25,000 for each such violation. Each day of such violation
shall, for purposes of this subsection, constitute a separate violation.
Id.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (Congress must clearly express waiver).
87 See Schnapf, State Hazardous Waste Programs Under the Federal Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 12 ENVTL. L. 679, 684 (1982) (citing Report to Congress- Disposal of
Hazardous Wastes, (1974) EPA Office Solid Waste Management Programs, SW-I15). In
1973, in consideration of RCRA, the EPA submitted a report to Congress recommending a
federal-state partnership. Id. at 865. The report maintained that state participation would
split costs and administrative burdens, and allow states involvement in what was essentially
a state problem. Id. Federal participation would reduce inconsistency among states adopt-
ing control programs. Id; Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance, supra note 1, at 517
("The partnership approach envisioned for the enforcement of federal environmental stat-
utes utilizes the strengths inherent in each governmental structure"); Note, When Will Fed-
eral Government Waive, supra note 1, at 583 (pollution laws favor federal-state cooperation).
" See Breen, supra note 37, at 1 (federal government most important drafter of environ-
mental legislation).
88 See Schnapf, supra note 87, at 697 (implementing minimum standards improves qual-
ity of environment).
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in legislation avoids the flight of industry from those states vigor-
ously pursuing environmental amelioration to states with substan-
tially less stringent requirements." Further, proximity to the
sources of pollution provides the states with a compelling motive
to implement and enforce environmental programs. 1
Despite many advantages offered by a federal-state partnership,
the present statutory scheme for federal compliance with environ-
mental protection provisions. fails to adequately protect the Amer-
ican public.9 Failure to impose on the federal government the
same responsibilities that are imposed on both states and private
entities, creates a deleterious effect on "federal-state cooperation
that is ...essential to a successful environmental protection ef-
fort."93 By permitting federal entities to avoid particular environ-
See Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance, supra note 1, at 518. "[A] uniform na-
tional program ...would eliminate the potential for location-based competitive advan-
tages." Id. "A state could not set lower standards than neighboring states to attract firms
interested in lower pollution control expenses." Id. at 519 n.19.
S1 See Id. at 518. "An active pollution control role for state governments is desirable
because local officials possess first-hand knowledge of pertinent economic, political, and
environmental conditions and public sentiments." Id. "[S]tate residents and workers di-
rectly suffer the ill effects of inadequate pollution control and enjoy the benefits of ade-
quate control." Id; see also Schnapf, supra note 87, at 737. "State agencies tend to be more
responsive to their citizens, act faster, and are more flexible in fashioning pragmatic solu-
tions to problems." Id.
" See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 171 (1976). Justice White pointed out the federal
government's poor record of compliance, stating that " 'instead of exercising leadership in
controlling or eliminating air pollution .... Federal agencies have been notoriously lag-
gard in abating pollution.'" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 4 (1970), 2 Legisla-
tive History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 894 (1974) (Comm. Print compiled for
the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress); S. REP. No. 1196, 91st
Cong., 37 (1970)). Id. Therefore, he noted that Congress added § 118 to the Clean Air Act
Congress intending that the federal government "provide the leadership to private indus-
try and to abate violations of air pollution standards by federal facilities . I..." Id; Note,
How Well Can States Enforce Their Environmental Laws When the Polluter is the United States?,
18 RUTGERS L.J. 123, 123-24 (1987) (federal government continues to add to environmen-
tal contamination problem); supra note 1 (discussion of federal government as polluter).
*" Shaw, Sovereign Immunity: Federal Compliance with State Permit Requirements Under the
Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, 6 SAN FERN. V.L. REV.
117, 121 (1978). The author suggested that since the federal facilities must comply with
state standards anyway, the courts should not be reluctant to treat them as any other per-
son would be treated in all aspects of the statutory scheme. Id. He found it difficult to
understand why the federal government would be subject to some state regulations, but
not all. Id. Having placed a large share of the burden of environmental protection on the
states, policy considerations urge that the federal facilities be treated on the same level as
private industry. Id. at 124-25. See Note supra note 92, at 143. Congress continues to real-
ize that wide spread waste problems are being caused by federal facilities, yet refuses to
explicitly waive sovereign immunity for civil penalties which would deter such irresponsibil-
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mental penalties, these otherwise influential environmental lead-
ers, would be placed in the position of saying "do as I say, not as I
do." 4 This undesirable result would persist until Congress clearly
waived sovereign immunity for environmental transgressions.9 5
It is further submitted that merely levying civil penalties on a
federal agency may not provide the necessary incentive to secure
federal compliance with legislation demanding safe disposal of
waste because the ultimate cost of these penalties will be borne by
the taxpayers.96 Moreover, since the payment of civil penalties by
the federal government is made directly into its own coffers,"7 it is
submitted that this sanction does little to further anti-pollution
goals.
Additionally, even when a federal agency attempts to comply
with the undoubtedly mandatory substantive requirements, often
the necessary funds are unavailable. 9
ity. Id. As a result, the states are forced to clean up at their own expense. Id.
"' See Murchison, Waivers of Intergovernmental Immunity in Federal Environmental Statutes,
62 VA. L. REV. 1177, 1207-08 (1976). Due to its "size and psychological importance, the
federal government as an institution is in a position to affect the quality of solid waste
management .... Federal facilities can serve as models of cooperation with state authori-
ties." Id.; see Anderson, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976: Closing the Gap,
1978 Wis. L. REV. 635, 674 (1978). As such, federal evasion of penalties encourages others
to not comply; Murchison, supra, at 1207. However, there are "[sitatements in the legisla-
tive history which indicate that Congress recognized the importance of federal leadership
in encouraging private industry to stop polluting." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 67-68 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1975); 116 CONG. REc.
19207 (1970) (remarks of M. Springer); Id. at 32920 (remarks of Sen. Spong)). See Shaw,
supra note 93, at 123-24. In consideration of the large federal contribution to environmen-
tal contamination and the huge expense of clean up involved, sound public policy demands
that the federal government should not have any less responsibility for pollution abatement
within a state than does any state citizen. Id. at 124.
9' See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976). Whatever the implications or inter-
pretations of Congress' intent, only Congress may actually waive sovereign immunity
through unequivocal legislation. Id.
" But see Stever, supra note 1, at 10114 (imposition of civil penalties on governmental
agency politically undesirable, therefore provide incentive to comply with environmental
legislation).
See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (civil penalties payable to United States
Treasury); see also Gwaltney Of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 53 (1987). If the citizen prevails in an action against any person allegedly in violation of
a NPDES permit, "the court may . . . impose civil penalties payable to the United States
Treasury." Id. (emphasis added).
See Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance, supra note 1, at 542 (federal agencies
must request funds from Congress). "The importance of the budgetary process lies in the
fact that Congress may decide to limit environmental compliance appropriations, even
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V. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROPOSALS
It is proposed that the proper interpretation of the Clean Water
Act and RCRA does not presently subject federal agencies to civil
penalties. It is further proposed that amendments be enacted by
Congress, after careful evaluation of all relevant ramifications and
policy considerations, focusing on the need to reserve adequate
funds to meet the substantive requirements mandated under the
Clean Water Act and RCRA.
It is submitted that the major federal agencies be individually
addressed at both the congressional level and the departmental
level. On the congressional level, it is proposed that when allocat-
ing budgets for each agency, Congress should evaluate the agency
in respect to the relevant environmental statutes, and reserve ade-
quate financing to implement the necessary pollution control de-
vices. Additionally, Congress should review the adequacy of such
reserve funds on a regular basis.
On the departmental level, it is proposed that a chain of respon-
sibility for hazardous waste disposal be instituted on all employees,
running from agency heads to those directly implementing waste
disposal. It is further suggested that mandatory education of all
employees involved in hazardous waste disposal be instituted, ad-
dressing limitations under applicable hazardous wasted statutes,
the legal responsibilities of the employees, and the potential civil
and criminal penalties imposed for noncompliance.
CONCLUSION
Improper and unsafe disposal of hazardous waste by the federal
government is a national problem. The potential consequences of
environmental irresponsibility by the federal government are of
enormous magnitude. It is therefore critical to impose upon the
federal government the same environmental responsibility im-
posed upon other entities. The future safety of our environment
demands that Congress provide explicit, intelligible, and consis-
tent legislation. Further, productive environmental legislation will
when the agency responsible for a particular facility makes the fund request as a good faith
response to state environmental regulators." Id.
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be realized only after careful examination by Congress of all rele-
vant ramifications and policy considerations in order to create a
sufficient incentive to secure federal compliance and responsibility
in this area.
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